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VANTAGE ON THE BAY:
GALVESTON AND THE RAILROADS
by William D. Angel, Jr.
On the eve of the Civil War, Galvestonians cockily proclaimed,
"The steady increase in the trade and general business of Galveston
leaves no room to doubt that it must ere long rival many of the principal
sea ports of the South.'" Indeed, the city possessed loeational endow-
ments so overwhelming that its prosperous destiny seemed certain.
Located on an island off the Texas coast, Galveston possessed a harbor
which many observers contended was the best along the entire Gulf
coast, from Pensacola to Vera Cruz,' and this harbor contributed to
the city's antebellum prosperity. In 1860, for example, the port handled
almost $16 million in cargo.' Galveston never realized its early pro-
mise, however, and by the beginning of the twentieth century, upstart
Houslon replaced it as southeast Texas' premier port. Geographic
advantages notwithstanding, human underachievement was responsible
for Galveston's relative failure.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Locational factors alone do not preordain a city's economic
success. Urban capitalists and politicians are important, particularly
those who display entrepreneurial characteristics. Urban entrepreneurs
are innovative capitalists and public officials who promote the town
by creatively applying any soeietal resource to encourage community
growth.' They differ from ordinary town promoters who boost the
local economy, but in a non-creative, non-innovative fashion.
Urban entrepreneurs are builders of infrastructure. Essential to
any city's economic success is the provision of an infrastructure which
will make the community more economically viable. Such infrastruc-
ture contributes goods or services which local businesses need not pro-
vide themselves (e.g. highways, railroads, canals, waterfront improve-
ments, industrial parks) and which are vital for specific forms of business
activity. Although the provision of these goods or services may be
publicly or privately administered, the pattern in which they are made
available and distributed has a definite bearing on a city's success. This
pattern constitutes the infrastructure and can include transportation
systems, utilities, educational facilities, and a skilled labor market.
Entrepreneurs can affect a city's economy by preparing or planning
infrastructural development.
They exert this influence by being innovative, that is, by "creatively
applying societal resources." They may adopt innovative infrastructure,
one which is new to their community and which has not gained wide-
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spread acceptance elsewhere, particularly among the city's closest rivals.
Or they may introduce a more conventional infrastructural form by
using innovative strategies, which consist primarily of booster methods
which few other communities have applied. Those capitalists or poli-
ticians who begin and direct such innovative initiatives are entre-
preneurs."
In a city where the capitalists and politicians are not innovative,
the consequences may be grave. The city will be slow to adopt new
types of infrastructure that may give it an "edge" Over rival communi-
ties. Or it simply may fail to attract a relatively common infrastructure,
but one which-if applied with a bit of creativity-could have a favor-
able impact on the city's economic progress. In either case, the city
either will collapse or will decline in relation to its closest competitors.
This brief study of Galveston will illustrate these arguments.
Although Galveston enjoyed excellent locational advantages, the
city's capitalists displayed few entrepreneurial qualities. During the
1850s Houston confronted Galveston with a rather serious challenge.
Houston's capitalists had organized and directed a series of railroad
projects, which by 1860 established that city as an important rail hub.
The Bayou City's railroad tentacles penetrated into north central Texas
(The Houston and Texas Central), plunged into the sugar producing
region of Brazoria County south of the city (The Houston Tap and
Brazoria), and extended to the Louisiana border (The Texas and New
Orleans). In addition, the Houston Tap and Brazoria fed into the
Buffalo Bayou, Brazos, and Colorado Railway (B.B.B.C.) which ran
to Columbus in central Texas.' Galveston's response to this challenge
from Houston was hardly an entrepreneurial one, and it would have
an important bearing upon consequent developments in those two cities.
GALVESTON AND RAILROAD DEVELOPMENT:
EARLY ATTITUDES
Even though Galveston merchants, financiers, and lawyers were
interested in railroads prior to 1856, their interest was not terribly keen.
When the Galveston Bay and Red River Railroad (later renamed the
Houston and Texas Central) was chartered in 1848, Willard Richard-
son, editor and publisher of the Galveston News, praised the line's
Houston promoters but at the same time urged that investment come
predominantly from those who directly benefitted from it, namely, land-
owners in the territory through which the railroad would pass. He did
not encourage Galveston's businessmen to support the company.'
Hamilton Stuart, editor and publisher of the Galveston Civilian,
expressed similar caution:
The project, we think, is well worthy of the careful attention
of OUf citizens ... The scheme is one of no insignificant
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magnitude. It will require time, energy, and means to carry
it out; and these must be yielded liberally and boldly to secure
success. On the other hand, economy and caution are equally
necessary, and their neglect may defeat the measure after all
the necessary means and appliances have been secured.'
Following such advice, the Galveston business community main-
tained extreme reluctance toward railroad enterprise. In 1850, the
city's merchants shunned Ebenezer Allen, a fellow Galvestonian and
founder of the Galveston Bay and Red River Railway (G.R.R.), who
asked them to subscribe to stock in his company. Such an investment
was too uncertain, argued John B. Jones, speaking for the city's mer-
chants, because the state's trade could not generate sufficient income
to support even one railroad.'
Similarly, in October 1852, Houston's railroad promoters chal-
lenged the city of Galveston to match their town's $200,000 subscription
to the G.R.R., but Riehardson scoffed at their request. Such an invest-
ment, he claimed, made little sense, as the "immediate benefits would
accrue to Houston." Although Richardson regarded the enterprise as
a practical one, he further protested that local capital could not be
invested until the road was extended to Houston:
When the road is extended to Houston, we doubt not but
that our citizens will endeavor to do their part by extending
it still farther to Galveston ... We are willing the terminus
should remain at Houston until the energies of the county may
require it to be extended to this point. And we are all the
more willing for this, because, as we have before said, our
citizens admit their inability to build railroads at this time
without taking the capital which is absorbed in business upon
which they depend for support.'"
As the editor of the News admitted, Galveston capitalists were unwilling
to risk their own capital in railroad endeavors. Content to see Hous-
tonians project rail lines throughout the countryside, they promised only
enough assistance to connect Galveston with the Houston system.
A corresponding attitude marked Galveston's response to the
B.B.B.C. When the La Grange Monument appealed to Houstonians
for investment in this Brazos valley railroad, Francis Moore, editor-
publisher of the Houston Telegraph and Texas Register, cited Galves-
ton's lack of interest:
If the railroad then is intended to be the main route from
Austin to Galveston, the editor of the Monument should not
complain of the citizens of Houston doing no more than the
citizens of Galveston toward constructing the road. He surely
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cannot expect that the citizens of Houston will come forward
and offer to furnish funds to complete the road, when as yet
the citizens of Galveston have not subscribed to a single dollar
stock in the railroad."
As Moore correctly reported, Galveston's capitalists were not
interested in the B.B.B.C. Jonathan Barrett, President of the B.B.B.C.,
labored continuously to solicit Galveston investment in his railroad.
He and the company's officers promised to establish their Harrisburg
terminal as an outlet for Galveston commerce. Their plan envisioned
hinterland trade arriving at Harrisburg, from where it would be lightered
to Galveston's wharves for ocean shipment." Accordingly, in 1853,
Barrett and John Tod, the company's assistant treasurer, spent con-
siderable time trying to convince Robert Mills, a leading Galveston
merchant-financier, to invest in the road. Mills declined, however,
thinking it foolish to invest in the B.B.B.C. until it actually commenced
service to Harrisburg. 11
Barrett himself bore part of the blame for Galveston's non-
response. He was reluctant to extend the B.B.B.C. from the mainland
to Galveston Island, because, at an estimated cost of $500,000, a
"Galveston Connection" was too expensive. His thinking was that
Galveston would always "communicate with the rest of the country
through the Gulf," and that it would be less costly to purchase "three
boats costing $20,000 each" to "do the business by water."" Barrett
thought that the attraction of a Harrisburg railhead would entice
Galveston capital to his company, but he was wrong, misjudging the
attitude of Galveston's business community. If the B.B.B.C. was about
to prepare a Harrisburg terminal for Galveston-bound trade, then why
should Galveston merchants invest their own capital in this project?
They could merely dispatch their own steamboats to Harrisburg, with-
out having to invest a cent in Barrett's company.
By the mid 1850s, however, most Galveston capitalists had recog-
nized the importance of railroads, and a few even began to assist rail-
road construction. In May 1855, Barrett chaired a meeting at which
he solicited subscriptions from several of Galveston's leading merchants,
bankers, and businessmen; Jonathan Dean, Jonathan B. Jones, Hugh
MeGeod, J. C. Kuhn, A. Ball, Henry Sheldon, E. B. Nichols, J. W.
Jockusch, Willard Richardson, L. M. Hitchcock, and J. F. Waddell."
In a November 1855 editorial, Richardson fully endorsed Barrett's
railroad, gave assurance that it was "no moonshine speculation" and
promised that "any aid our citizens may extend will only help to expedite
it so much more."'.
It would appear that Galvestonians had reversed their stance on
railroads, but in fact they only viewed them as subordinate to their
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city's advantages as a seaport. Willard Richardson observed that the
Houston & Texas Central (formerly the Galveston Bay & Red River)
would "enable the produce of the country to reach this place [Galves-
ton] with almost as much cheapness and dispatch, as if the road had
its terminus here; for the close connection that must be established
and kept up between the steamers and the cars, will prevent any material
delay, beyond the few minutes required to transfer passengers and
freight from one to another."" As Richardson indicated, Galvestonians
finaUy had recognized the worth of railroads, but only as a means for
funneUing hinterland trade to Galveston steamboats.
Though aware of the railroad's importance, Galveston capitalists
still regarded a water-oriented infrastructure vital, almost sufficient in
itself to ensure their city's economic prosperity. Expressing this attitude,
Richardson wrote:
We have always looked upon our navigation ... as affording
to Galveston and the people of the country, nearly all the
advantages of a railroad of the same extent. The great diffi-
culty is that this navigation does not extend far enough and
this deficiency can only be supplied by railroads. But for the
purposes of transportation, this navigation ... answers nearly
aU the ends of a great railroad trunk, and we shall feel about
the same interest in railroad connecting with it, and drawing
trade from different parts of the country, as we should if those
roads were the branches leading to this city."
Galvestonians were uninterested in building their own railroads, as long
as they could maintain a water connection with any mainland rail
system. They saw nothing dangerous in Houston's railroad promotion,
provided that Galveston barges were allowed to dock at that city's
wharves.
Throughout the decade, Galveston capitalists emphasized harbor
and wharf improvements, a conventional form of infrastructure, and
clung stubbornly to their belief that the Island City's status as a natural
port would sustain future growth. The vehicle for enhancing these
waterfront facilities was the Galveston Wharf and Cotton Press Com-
pany, a semi-public corporation in which one-third of the stock was
owned by the city of Galveston. Associates of the company were promi-
nent Galveston merchants and bankers: M. B. Menard, Samuel M.
Williams, Stacy B. Lewis, J. S. LeCiare, Henry Williams, John Sealy,
Henry Rosenberg, J. L. Darragh, Isadore Dyer, J. G. Duffield, C. G.
WeUs, Thomas Shearer, A. F. James, Henry de St. Cyr, Robert Mills,
and E. B. Nichols." Chartered in 1854, the Wharf Company absorbed,
combined, and purchased all competing firms, creating in their stead
a monopolistic service for handling and processing commerce on the
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Galveston waterfront. The company charged excessive fees, paid huge
dividends to its investors, and plowed most of its profits back into
harbor'and waterfront improvements." At the time, Galveston mer-
chants saw this enterprise as the primary means for increasing their
personal wealth and their city's prosperity. As such, they preferred the
Wharf Company to any railroad endeavor.
Prior to 1856, Galveston capitalists lacked innovation in their
infrastructural choice. They were followers-not leaders-in railroad
building. Where Houston's business community organized its own rail-
road system with local capital and then urged other jurisdictions to join
the effort, Galveston's merchants delayed, waiting until hinterland towns
and settlements demonstrated faith that they would invest in railroads.
Even then, Galvestonians maintained a "wait-and-see" attitude, fearing
that their capital would subsidize growth at various back-country
locations. In the meantime, they firmly held to the ideal that theirs
was the best port in the state and neglected to create a Galveston-
oriented rail network. Galvestonians would have been much more
innovative (and hence, entrepreneurial) had they adopted railroad
infrastructure at an early date and committed their capital and their
efforts to building a rail network with its intersection at Galveston.
GALVESTON AND ITS RAILROAD
By 1856, Galvestonians recognized Houston's threat to their com-
mercial advantage. If Houston persisted in building railroads, including
one connecting with New Orleans, Galveston could become isolated
from mainland commerce and could lose its reputation as Texas' premier
port. As a result, previous beliefs began to change, and Galveston at
last initiated its only antebellum railroad-the Galveston, Houston and
Henderson (G.H.&H.).
Chartered in 1853, the G.H.&H. immediately began construction
to Houston from Virginia Point, a spot on the mainland near Galveston
Island." Feeling that a B.B.B.C. terminal at Harrisburg would suffice
as a rail outlet for their commerce, Galveston merchants and financiers
withheld support from the G.H.&H.," and in February 1856, only
three miles had been finished." But with Houston's railroad enterprise
looming larger and more foreboding, the G.H.&H.'s directors were able
to push construction forward, completing twenty miles by May 1857,"
In June 1859, the entire forty mile distance between Virginia Point and
Houston was Hironed out.'~u
The company's shortage of capital was an immediate--but not an
underlying-cause for the construction delay. The G.H.&H. relied on
French and British capital, as W. J. Valentine, a British investor,
reminded his compatriots in Galveston: "The large amount of capital
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for constructing the line has not been furnished by your citizens; it is
foreign capital .. .''"" Valentine's remarks came after an inspection trip
to Galveston in which he attempted to exhort Galvestonians to carry
the enterprise forward." Supervising the company was not exactly a
local operation either, as in 1857, Richard Kimball, a New York rail-
road promoter, was the company's president, while Valentine, T. P.
Anderson, and W. C. Lacey-all non-Texans-served on the board of
directors." Without the backing and efforts of local capitalists, the
road remained a speculative enterprise, profiting mostly those who
bought and sold stock in paper railroad companies.
In May, 1857, Galvestonians began to exhibit more enthusiasm
toward the G.H.&H. At the May 9 celebration marking the completion
of twenty miles, Judge Leslie Thompson and Hugh McCleod, a Galves-
ton merchant, urged the city to build a bridge linking Galveston with
the mainland road. Kimball had proposed this project at a special
session of the city council held on May 7. With Thompson, McCleod,
J. S. Sydnor, Thomas M. League, and other Galveston businessmen
present, the council submitted for voter approval a $100,000 bond issue
to finance bridge construction to Virginia Point. Wanting speedy
approval so as to forestall any opposition, the council scheduled the
election for May 19."
The drive for voter ratification was swift and decisive. At a May
12 organizational meeting, Mayor J. H. Brown, M. M. Potter, Henry
de SI. Cyr, J. S. Sydnor, R. H. Howard, and H. H. Andrews established
a series of three-member committees to campaign in each ward, to make
certain that people voted, and to provide "conveyance for those who
asked for it.'''' At one public rally, St. Cyr, John B. Jones, Potter, and
Leslie Thompson quieted fears that Galveston was assuming too much
responsibility for the project. According to the Galveston News, they
expressed their "hearty concurrence in the proposed measure, their
conviction that its importance was such as to decide the future destiny
of our city for weal or for woe, if defeated."" Of this effort, SI. Cyr
observed, "Never before have we known so much unanimity and
enthusiasm manifested by our citizens on any public question.'''' Voters
approved the issue 741 to II, whereupon Mayor Brown appointed
Sydnor, League, and Thompson to confer with G.H.&H. officials and
report a plan for "carrying out the will of the people,m~
Following this early spurt of enthusiasm, Galvestonians resumed
more lackadaisical ways. The city council did not want the city to
assume total responsibility for the project and hesitated to let contracts
for building the bridge. Fearing that the city would pay for a bridge
that would profit a private company, Galveston officials wanted some
assurances that the G.H.&H. would also contribute to the project."
This delay caused an exasperated St. Cyr to declare:
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Is it proper or not that the city of Galveston should build the
bridge? The talking about it will probably take from 3 to 6
months more, the negotiations for the contract as much longer,
and the actual building of the bridge, when it is commenced,
will require another 6 months before it is completed. Con-
sidering that public opinion in this case has been formed and
manifested with a degree of unanimity seldom ever witnessed,
I think the time I have allowed for further discussion, negoti-
ation, and action is quite sufficient to cover all reasonable
causes for further delay in this great enterprise."
In July 1858, a breakthrough finally came. St. Cyr called a meet-
ing attended by E. B. Nichols, James Sorley, Hugh McCleod, J. S.
Sydnor, L A. Thompson, Thomas League, and B. S. Parsons, where-
upon he urged the city to "quickly begin construction." St. Cyr asserted
that if the city would only provide the bridge structure, the G.H.&H.
would then lay the track. He further promised that an agreement amen-
able to the city's interests could be reached with the company." The
city and the company accepted SI. Cyr's proposal and drew a contract,
in which the city promised to begin construction immediately." Galves-
ton agreed to issue $100,000 in bonds, the proceeds from their sale to
be paid directly to a private contractor for building the bridge. The
G.H.&H. was required to service the bonded debt and to maintain the
bridge in good repair, while the city would hold title to the right of
way.a
Bridge construction began in September 1858, but not until April
1859 did work begin on the line between Galveston and the bridge."
Finally in February 1860, the bridge and its approaches were completed,
and the G.H.&H. was open to rail traffic between Galveston and
Houston-almost three years after Galveston voters had approved the
issuance of bonds for bridge construction. Perhaps the Civilian best
summarized the story of this enterprise which gave Galveston rail access
to the mainland when it remarked, "The bridge is built ... notwith-
standing the many blunders which delayed completion of the road.""
RAILROAD PROMOTION AT GALVESTON
Although the Galveston Bridge was among the longest in the
United States at the time, the problems that stalled its construction were
not technological ones, for it took but a short time to build the bridge.
A major difficulty was that Galveston capitalists only apathetically were
involved in the project. At one point Willard Richardson became so
frustrated that he lambasted the local business community:
... Is it not strange with all our wealth, population, and local
advantages, we cannot even muster enterprise enough to build
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a bridge across our bay to bring the road built by others into
town ... ? Well, if apathy does any good, we think we have
built our share of the bridge."
In 1856, Richardson similarly had chided Galvestonians for "wait-
ing as we have been waiting for the 20 years past, for the people of the
country, or for capitalists from abroad, or for railroad corporations,
or for somebody else beside ourselves, to make some great highway
by which the trade of the interior may pass its wealth into our laps
and give a tenfold value to our property.""
Richardson's assessment of Galveston's business community was
essentially correct. Galveston businessmen were capitalists without
foresight, timid merchants who only sporadically invested in railroads
and other internal improvements and who consistently expected others
to carry the brunt of investment responsibility. They hesitated when it
came to railroad enterprise and sought ways to minimize their risks,
rather than taking initiatives that would have penetrated the hinterland
barrier and expanded local accumulation opportunities.
Had Galveston established rail connections with mainland pro-
ducers, the city's merchants might have been able to steer hinterland
trade directly into the Island City. Instead, local capitalists first watched
Houston's entrepreneurs build railroads into the frontier and then tried
to connect their "trunk line" (the G.H.&H.) with the Houston railroads.
Houstonians balked at this prospect, and their city's board of aldermen
refused permission for the G.H.&H. to establish a direct rail connection
with the Houston and Texas Central." The aldermen thought that the
G.H.&H. would merely tap into the Houston-oriented rail network,
thus allowing hinterland trade to flow directly into Galveston without
pausing for transhipment at Houston." The connection was finally
made in 1865, when the Galveston and Houston Junction Railroad
provided the necessary link."
Taken as a whole, Galveston businessmen were not entrepreneurs.
That is, they failed to adopt the railroad infrastructure at a time when
such a move could be judged as ir.novative. Instead, they hesitated and
allowed Houston the opportunity to apply this innovation and become
an important rail hub. Throughout this episode, Galvestonians exhibited
limited foresight, imagined few new vistas for local commerce, and
stalled when more creative members of the business community sug-
gested daring alternatives. Yet Galveston's citizens had ample oppor-
tunity to foster railroad development in the state and thus to create an
infrastructure that would complement their port's mercantile advantages.
Why did they not invest in the Galveston Bay and Red River Railroad
before it became the Houston and Texas Central? Why did they decline
to subscribe to stock in the B.B.B.C., a move which could have given
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Iheir city a direct rail conneclion to the Tcxas frontier? Why did they
wait So long to build a rail trestle to connect the island with the main-
land? In short, wby did Galveston capitalists not take a more energetic
role in transportation enterprise?
Again, Richardson provides an appropriate answer: " ... The
impression seems to have been that the great natural advantages of
Galveston, as the commercial emporium of Texas, are such as cannot
be counteracted by the rival interests and enterprise of other places and
that those advantages will secure our future prosperity even in spite of
ourselves."" Galvestonbns saw little sense in investing their capital
in railroad enterprises when the community's prosperity seemed ensured
by its location on Galveston Bay. Furthermore, because Galveston
served as a natural staging point for all Texas commerce, it was expected
that railroads would have to comc to the city anyway.
Richardson, however, observed that dogmatic faith in Galveston
geographic advantages could prove fatal and disastrous for city's
property owners. In 1856, for example, he warned:
It may be true that Galveston is destined eventually to become
a large commercial seaport, whatever our present property
holders may do or may not do. But it should be remembered
that TIME, with most of us at least is an important consider-
ation in our estimate of what mayor may not take place in
the future.... Without some new impulse given to our trade,
without some more effort to make Galveston accessible as
a market for the back country, the next twenty years will
probably be as fruitless as those that are past. Does any man
suppose it possible for Galveston to become anything more
than a secondary place of trade, or rather port of establish-
ment for the trade of other places, without some connection
with the mainland?"
And when Galvestonians finally began to heed Richardson's warning
and became more interested in railroad construction, the only significant
effort was the trunk line to Houston (G.H.&H.). As far as Galveston
merchants were concerned, however, the G,H.&H. was quite sufficient:
"The trade of all parts of the interior of our immense state is gradually
being concentrated at this port by means of the various railroads nOW
in progress of construction, all of which, with but one Or two exceptions,
are either in connection, or soon will be, with the trunk road from
Houston."~·
This trunk road, in effect, established Houston as a break-in bulk
point for Galveston commerce and did not provide Galveston with
direct rail connections with the Texas hinterland. That is, interior
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produce first arrived in Houston via one of its railroads, was unloaded
and placed on cars bound for Galveston via the G.H.&H. Galveston
merchants shortsightedly viewed the trunk as a transportation artery
which complemented their city's natural advantages, but in reality it
made Galveston commerce dependent upon a Houston-oriented rail
network and enhanced Houston as a competitor to Galveston.
GALVESTON AND THE RAILROADS:
THE POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD
Following the Civil War, Galveston businessmen belatedly recog-
nized that the inadequate rail infrastructure indeed could isolate their
city from the rest of the state. Galveston was heavily dependent on the
Houston trunk, a weakness which Houston merchants often exploited.
During the fall of each year, rumors would circulate of a yellow fever
epidemic in Galveston, and Houston would quarantine all Galveston
commerce. It so happened that these yellow fever epidentics coincided
with the cotton harvest, a situation which forced all of Houston's cotton
shipments to be rerouted around Galveston."
Another threat involved the post-war expansion of the transcon-
tinental rail system. The Texas rail network converged at Houston,
"cutting Galveston off on every side," and it was evident that goods
could be transported to Eastern markets without passing through
Galveston at all. Accordingly, Galveston capitalists feared that existing
transportation routes would enable commerce to bypass their city to
the benefit of other Gulf Coast cities--namely, Houston, Port Lavaca,
New Orleans, or Mobile." They summed up their fears in an 1871
document which urged the immediate construction of a Galveston-
oriented rail system:
Galveston is purely a commercial city. Successful commerce
at the present day means simply the cheapest and quickest
method of exchanging commodities; and look where we will,
we see those commercial centres the most prosperous that
control the quickest transit connections between producer and
consumer ... Galveston has not, nor never can have one-fifth
the degree of prosperity naturally due her geographic position,
unless her citizens control her avenues of commerce and make
them more than equal to those that her competitors are using
against her. 51
By the 1870s, Galveston had begun to acquire alternate rail con-
tracts to the mainland. In 1870, T. W. Pierce, an eastern railroad
promoter, and a few Galveston associates chartered the Galveston,
Harrisburg, and San Antonio Railroad Company (G.H.&S.A.). This
road acquired the property of the B,B.B.C. and extended track to San
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Antonio. In 1877, it connected with the G.H.&H., thus giving Galves-
ton a direct linkage to San Antonio." In 1881 it merged with Collis
Huntington's Southern Pacific system, and Galveston had at last tapped
the transcontinental rail network.
Another railroad, the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe (G.C.&S.F.),
was more of an entrepreneurial effort in that it was inspired and orga-
nized by Galveston businessmen." Incorporated in 1873, the G.c.&S.F.
roughly paralleled the old B.B.B.C. route until it reached Richmond,
where it turned northward toward the Panhandle to connect with the
Santa Fe system. By 1886, several branch lines had been established,
and the line had given Galveston direct rail contact with interior towns,
such as Fort Worth, Dallas, and Temple."
Both the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific railroads were of a defen-
sive character. Neither isolated Houston or diverted commerce
around that community, since both built spurs to the Bayou City.
Instead, they gave Galveston direct access to the interior and forestalled
any attempts to isolate Galveston from the mainland.
THE RAILROADS' ECONOMIC IMPACT
Although the Gulf Coast railroads decisively enhanced Houston's
economy," the Bayou City's rail infrastructure did not immediately
subvert Galveston's prosperity. During the years 1856 through 1860,
Galveston County's aggregate property value increased from $3,976,000
to $7,265,000, an 83% gain. Land values rose from $1.14/acre to
$3.55/acre, an increase of 211 % and the total value of town lots grew
from $2,420,000 to $5,126,000, a 116% increase."
A closer measure of Galveston's prosperity is revealed in com-
mercial data. Between 1856 and 1860, the value of Galveston exports
increased by 196%, from $4,344,000 to $12,873,000." Cotton ship-
ments fluctuated during this time frame, probably due to seasonal
variations, but at no time did Galveston export less cotton than
Houston. In fact, Galveston handled 119,563 bales/year between 1856
and 1860, whereas Houston averaged only 73,683 bales/year." Clearly,
Houston's railroads did not immediately undermine the Island City's
commercial success.
In fact, throughout the nineteenth century, Galveston reigned
supreme, at least from a mercantile standpoint. In 1890, Galveston
transported $51,588,000 worth of cargo, as compared to Houston's
$13,881,000, and Galveston's cotton shipments were twice those of
Houston (893,944 bales to 322,384 bales)." Furthermore, Galveston
handled over 79% of Texas cotton crop in 1890 and over 82% in
1900." Despite Houston's status as a railroad center, Galveston still
was mightily significant as an entrepot.
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By the turn of the century, however, Galveston and Houston had
developed two entirely different economic bases, and the latter's was
more adaptable to the industrial spurt that would occur in Texas during
the twentieth century. Following the Civil War their two economies
diverged in different directions. In 1870, Galveston's manufacturing
was more significant. It had more manufacturing establishments than
Houston (91 to 64), and the city's total value of manufactured goods
was $1,215,000, compared to Houston's $579,000." During the
remainder of the nineteenth century, however, Houston experienced a
tremendous industrial surge, until by 1900, its manufacturing output
was twice that of Galveston's. In that year, Houston factories produced
$10,642,000 in manufactured products, while Galveston firms manu-
factured $5,016,000 in industrial goods."
Furthermore, by 1900 each city possessed a different industrial
mix. In that year, a significant proportion of Houston's manufactured
products was associated with higher order industries, with over 40 %
of the value of the city's manufactured goods coming from railroad shop
construction, foundry and machine products, sheet metals, brick and
stone, and cotton seed oil. Also prominent were processing, mercantile,
and service industries, such as cotton compressing, bread and bakery,
carpentering, confectionery, and lumber. 6 ~
In contrast, Galveston's industries were predominantly mercantile
and processing in nature. The city's most important manufactured
products derived from industries upon which its commerce depended:
cotton compressing, flour and grist, lumber, bread and bakery, printing
and publishing. Aside from its shoe industry and foundry operations-
which together accounted for only 7% of the value of Galveston's
manufactures-the Island City's economy was much less oriented
toward heavy industry and far less diversified than was Houston's."
Although Houston's railroads had failed immediately to place the
city on an economic par with Galveston, they did enable the Bayou
City to become a major transhipment center for Galveston-bound trade.
As a result, the community became viable as a site for processing and
packaging industries, until by 1909, it had become a preeminent manu-
facturing center, contributing nearly 9% of the total value added to
Texas manufacturers. 8S Thus, Houston's railroad network constituted
an infrastructural asset that was particularly applicable at a later time,
and as a result, its effect upon the Houston-Galveston rivalry was not
noticeable until several years after the railroads were put into
operation.U
CONCLUSION
Galveston capitalists responded to railways in a most non-
entrepreneurial fashion. Proceeding with caution and skepticism, the
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city's merchants at first were unwilling to invest their own capital in
railroad enterprise because they feared that such investment would
impart .advantages to interior towns. They reasoned that Galveston's
superiority as a seaport would inevitably attract the railroads, that
interior towns needed Galveston more than Galveston needed them,
and that railways could not bestow advantages any greater than those
already supplied by the city's magnificent harbor. After all, the argu-
ment continued, Galveston was and would continue to be Texas'
commercial emporium; so why rush into railroad construction when
there was no need to?
By neglecting railroad enterprise, Galveston's capitalists permitted
Houston's entrepreneurs to challenge their preeminence. Houston
became a transhipment center for Galveston-bound trade, relegating
the Island City to dependence upon the Houston rail system. In addi-
tion, railroad development allowed Houston to create a diversified
economic base, establishing both mercantile and industrial economies.
By contrast, Galveston grew only as an entrepot for nineteenth century
commerce. Although Houston's entrepreneurs partially fostered this
outcome, by organizing the first and most extensive rail network in
Texas, the result also was assisted by Galveston's capitalists, who
displayed a paucity of entrepreneurship.
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